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Abstract
RIES stands for Rijnland Internet Election System. It is
an online voting system that has been used twice in the fall
of 2004 for in total over two million potential voters. In this
paper we describe how this system works. Furthermore we
describe how the system allowed us to independently ver-
ify the outcome of the elections—a key feature of RIES. To
conclude the paper we evaluate possible threats to this sys-
tem and describe some possible points for improvement.
1. Introduction
RIES, the Rijnland Internet Election System, was devel-
oped by the ‘Hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland’, one of the
Dutch local authorities for water management. In the rest of
this paper we will refer to this authority by ‘Rijnland’. The
Netherlands is divided in approximately 35 ‘waterschap-
pen’. These are local authorities responsible for almost any-
thing that has to do with water in their region (except drink-
ing water): the quality of the water, the quantity of the wa-
ter, the quality of the dikes and so on. In the Netherlands
this is a serious matter.
These authorities have their own elections with typically
between a half and one million potential voters. As a local
authority these elections do not have to follow the Dutch
‘kieswet’, the national law on how elections should be ar-
ranged in the Netherlands. They are free to use their own
system as long as their board has approved it. In order to
increase the number of people actually casting their vote
and simultaneously decrease the cost of such an election,
Rijnland decided to invest in setting up an internet elec-
tion system, even though in general it is absolutely not clear
whether this can be done securely. See for instance [4], in
which a very critical view towards internet voting is pre-
sented and the advice is given not to use this technology at
all because of inherent vulnerabilities, and [5], in which a
brief response is given to [4], mentioning RIES.
Rijnland’s previous election in 1999 was an election by
ordinary mail. The overall turnout was in the order of 22%.
Unfortunately for Rijnland, the turnout in 2004 decreased to
17% of which 31% voted via the internet. Still, this amounts
to over 70.000 online votes, making it one of the largest
internet elections held so far. The second time RIES was
used, during the elections for the water management author-
ity ‘De Dommel’, showed a similar turnout. See Figure 1
for the precise figures. Since it is not relevant for this pa-
Rijnland De Dommel
Potential voters 1.363.787 100% 878.118 100%
Collected votes 232.882 17% 100% 170.397 19% 100%
Internet votes 72.235 5% 31% 50.196 6% 29%
Mail votes 160.647 12% 69% 120.201 14% 71%
Figure 1. Election turnout figures
per, we will not address whether the new system was a suc-
cess or not, from the turnout perspective. We will only ad-
dress technical and procedural matters.
Rijnland started their development by asking a third
party to check the security risks involved with setting up
an internet voting system. The Dutch company TNO car-
ried out this preparatory research and came to the following
conclusions:
• Many risks involved in voting by internet are not
higher than in voting by ordinary mail.
• There are some risks typical to internet settings such as
DDOS attacks and Trojan horses on client machines.
However, there exist procedural counter measures for
the specific situation of internet voting.
• None of the systems available for internet voting at the
time were suitable for Rijnland’s election.
See [10] for the complete report.
Based upon this TNO report, Rijnland decided to de-
velop and build its own system. It set up a project team
which included one of the co-authors of the TNO report,
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Maclaine Pont. Based upon the ideas from the master’s the-
sis [6] of one of his former students, Robers, he designed
the RIES system. In order to get some return on their invest-
ment Rijnland and Maclaine Pont have applied for patents
on the system [2]. In Section 2 we discuss RIES in detail.
At this stage we only point out the distinguishing feature of
RIES: its transparency. Before the elections take place all
potential outcomes are published. Via clever but elemen-
tary use of hashes and secret encryptions each voter can ac-
tually check afterwards if his vote has contributed appropri-
ately to the final outcome. See for instance [1] and [8] for
cryptographically more advanced systems.
Several independent parties have looked at the RIES sys-
tem before it was actually used during the elections. This is
where the authors of this paper enter the picture, since they
were involved in this evaluation. During a public workshop
[9] before the elections most of these parties presented their
findings.
As independent outsiders the authors have evaluated the
RIES system before use, and have critically followed its de-
ployment, including third party counting of the electronic
votes as described in Section 3. An earlier publication,
[3], presented RIES to a national audience, but this paper
presents it—together with our findings—to an international
public. Of course, RIES and its underlying ideas, are not
ours. Our contribution in this paper lies in an accessible de-
scription and a critical evaluation.
In Section 4 we describe to what extent RIES is vulnera-
ble to general, well known attacks. In Section 5 we describe
some of our findings that we think could be done differently
to make the system more trustworthy.
2. RIES: the system
Before we provide the reader with the details of RIES,
we first want to emphasize the main idea. Essential in the
system is that before the election a pre-election reference ta-
ble is published which contains all possible valid votes rep-
resented by key-less hashes (MDC) together with a map-
ping to the corresponding candidates. During the election
the legitimate voters build up a post-election table with their
votes represented by hashes using their personal secret key
(MAC). This table will also be published. The outcome of
the election is calculated by computing key-less hashes of
each vote in the post-election table. If the vote is valid, its
hash value can be found in the pre-election table and the
chosen candidate can be determined. And since this hash is
a key-less hash, anyone can compute it, hence anyone can
check the result of the elections.
As mentioned earlier, Robers did his research under su-
pervision of Maclaine Pont. And because his system, based
upon keys in smartcards, was not patented in 1998 but pub-
lished as [6], it could be used as a starting point for RIES.
However there are some major differences:
• Because of the cost aspect it was out of the question to
give each potential voter a multi-function smartcard.
Therefore RIES uses a different system for key man-
agement and authentication.
• Robers’s system is a purely electronic voting system.
RIES is not, since it also provides the possibility to
vote by regular mail.
• Robers’s system makes a strict distinction be-
tween several roles within the system: the authority,
the anonymizer and the voter. In RIES this distinc-
tion is less clear.
These issues will be discussed in more detail below.
2.1. Smartcard replacement
In Robers’s system the smartcard is used for two pur-
poses: to hold the secret keys and to perform computation
of the key-less MDC hash and key-based MAC.
Distribution of the secret key within RIES is done by
printing it in sixteen characters on a ballot and sending it
by ordinary mail to the voter. Obviously, the voter must be
careful with this paper with his printed secret key. No-one
else should be able to copy or memorize the sixteen charac-
ters on his ballot. Hence after voting he should make sure
that the key is destroyed.
The cryptographic computations in RIES are done by
the client’s computer using JavaScript. If a voter wants to
vote, his browser connects to a web server and downloads
a page that contains JavaScript. Within these scripts there
are routines available to compute the MDC and MAC val-
ues. Of course letting the client’s computer do these compu-
tations implies a certain risk: the JavaScript code can easily
be modified in order to send arbitrary data to the server try-
ing to impersonate legitimate voters. We will get back to
this in Section 4. However, in order to cast a valid vote, a
client’s computer should either be lucky enough to guess
both a valid VOTER ID and a valid identifier for the cho-
sen candidate, or it must operate as a virus and read the se-
cret key from the voter as he enters it. The first situation
is quite unlikely since both identifiers are sixteen hexadec-
imal characters long. The second situation can be detected
if the voter checks his vote afterwards. But then it is too
late to change the vote. See (1) later on for the definition of
VOTER ID.
2.2. Integration with mail voting system
The merging of the electronic votes and the ordinary mail
votes comes down to a transformation of the latter ones to
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the same format as used by the electronic votes: the so-
called technical vote. See (3) later on. On each paper ballot
there are some special numbers from which the VOTER ID
and the MACKvoter(CANDIDATE ID) can be computed.
The algorithm used for this has not been made public, but
obviously the secret voter key needs to be in those numbers
somehow. Hence after this transformation the mail votes are
handled the same way as internet votes.
In the original setup of RIES the mail voters were not
getting any feedback on this transformation to a technical
vote, and hence they were not able to check what had been
done with their vote. However, to overcome this drawback,
RIES has used some kind of shadow system to be used af-
ter the elections. This shadow system offers the possibility
to compute the technical vote after the elections, if the vot-
ers kept their original ballot with the keys on it. Obviously,
this implies that mail voters should use some internet sys-
tem after all to check their vote, which is not very likely to
happen. If they would have felt comfortable with internet
they probably would have voted by internet to begin with.
However, in the previous election which was done entirely
by ordinary mail, it was not possible at all for the voter to
check his vote, hence this drawback does not make the sys-
tem any worse than the previous one.
2.3. Roles within RIES
Whereas Robers emphasizes a clear pattern of who does
what, such a compartmentalization is not so clear in the
RIES system. Main party in the actual elections in the fall of
2004 is a company called TTPI which consists of the archi-
tect of RIES, Maclaine Pont, and the main developer Han-
nink. For instance they take care of creating the secret keys,
publishing the reference tables, merging the mail votes with
the internet votes and computing the final outcome. In par-
ticular this means that this TTPI company knows all the
ins and outs of the system, including the secret keys, which
makes it a very powerful player.
Other parties involved in RIES are the board of Rijn-
land, SURFnet (for the server infrastructure) and of course
the potential voters.
2.4. The details
We will describe the RIES details by looking at the dif-
ferent phases of the procedure: before, during and after the
voting.
Before the voting Most of the work before the actual voting
takes place is done by TTPI. It starts by generating a unique
ELECTION ID for the upcoming election. Next, a DES key
Ki for each voter i is generated. These keys are printed on
the ballots. Furthermore TTPI uses these keys to generate
the VOTER ID
VOTER ID = MACKvoter(ELECTION ID) (1)
and the complete ballot collections shown in (2).

MDC(MACKvoter(ELECTION ID))
MDC(MACKvoter(CANDIDATE ID1))
' CANDIDATE ID1
MDC(MACKvoter(CANDIDATE ID2))
' CANDIDATE ID2
...
MDC(MACKvoter(CANDIDATE IDN ))
' CANDIDATE IDN


(2)
By combining all these ballot collections the so-called ref-
erence table or pre-election table is created. It contains all
possible outcomes. The '-sign represents the link between
the hashed value and the candidate. This reference table is
published on the internet in the form of a two level .zip file.
See Figure 2 for an example.
Archive: 01010204.zip
Length Date Time Name
-------- ---- ---- ----
2172 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙0.zip
4017 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙1.zip
2173 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙2.zip
1865 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙3.zip
2789 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙4.zip
3097 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙5.zip
2787 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙6.zip
1559 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙7.zip
1559 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙8.zip
2480 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙9.zip
2784 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙A.zip
3405 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙B.zip
2785 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙C.zip
1867 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙D.zip
1559 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙E.zip
3403 08-25-04 09:32 01010204/RT˙F.zip
0 08-25-04 08:51 01010204/
-------- -------
40301 17 files
Archive: RT˙0.zip
Length Date Time Name
-------- ---- ---- ----
220 08-25-04 09:31 008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553
220 08-25-04 09:31 08677B73378E1D59153DE30263A3C47C
220 08-25-04 09:31 06CAC042AF7D6940DD8A51814E68DFF8
220 08-25-04 09:31 00FEA51461FBF7B406554EEF2E23554D
220 08-25-04 09:31 05C02BD8E3863DB24D6C332A17B78EFB
220 08-25-04 09:32 070C60BFFC06B7355425E6FFADBBED30
220 08-25-04 09:32 034C37BA687E21477D38A110954207B8
-------- -------
1540 7 files
008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553:
vervangend=0
verstrekt=1
vervallen=0
AC94983743058334B25452E0F63A9C20=0101020401
B0015BAC8ECF766DB67825592DC10957=0101020402
ACE42133255CA8184D18E0293FEF7EE8=0101020403
358AAB0C934757ACCF071A1CD732EDEA=0101020499
Figure 2. Reference table format.
The first block represents the top level of the refer-
ence table for the election 01010204. The second block
shows the next level: all hashed VOTER IDs starting with
0 are archived into RT 0.zip. At the bottom we see the bal-
lot collection for the voter with MDC(VOTER ID) =
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008AB1E98AEDFBA450A1813DDC153553. It con-
tains three lines with status bits indicating whether the
ballot is a replacement, used or revoked. Because this par-
ticular election only had three real candidates (0101020401,
0101020402, 0101020403) and one blank (0101020499)
there are only four entries found after the status bits.
After publication of these reference tables together with
their MD5 hashes, TTPI no longer needs the secret DES
keys and destroys them. Checking that this actually hap-
pens (before the elections) is a procedural matter. In Fig-
ure 3 we have presented the actions of the parties involved
by means of a message sequence chart.
TTPI Voter i
Generate
voter keys
K1,. . . ,KN
Compute
pre-election
table
Send Ki
Publish pre-election table
Destroy
keys
Before the voting
Figure 3. Phase 1: before the voting
During the voting During the actual voting two parties are
active. The vote server which is operated by SURFnet,
the national internet service provider for universities in the
Netherlands, and of course the voter.
Voter i copies the codes printed on his ballot into the ap-
propriate fields of the web page www.internetstemmen.nl.
In particular this means that he hands over his personal key
Ki to the JavaScript engine of his browser. If he managed
to do this without mistakes he can click on his favorite can-
didate j. The JavaScript engine in his browser will compute
the so-called technical vote:(
VOTER ID = MACKvoter(ELECTION ID)
MACKvoter(CANDIDATE ID)
)
(3)
This vote is sent to the vote server through SSL, and hence
it is encrypted and cannot be revealed by other parties be-
sides the voter and the vote server. Note in particular that the
secret key Ki is not sent over the internet and that the infor-
mation in this technical vote alone cannot identify a voter.
Therefore, if the server receives such an SSL-encrypted
vote, it decrypts it and strips all meta information like time,
date and network address from the vote before storing it.
It computes a cryptographic receipt confirmation and sends
this back to the voter. After receiving this confirmation, the
voter should carefully destroy his ballot with his secret key.
Furthermore he should store his technical vote (3) in or-
der to perform a check afterwards. The receipt confirma-
tion needs to be stored by the voter in order to prove after-
wards that his vote was received by the server. See Figure 4.
Voter i SURFnet
Compute
technical
vote
Send technical vote
Send receipt confirmation
Strip date,
time and
network info
Save
technical
vote and
receipt
confirmation
Destroy
paper ballot
Store
stripped
technical
vote
During the voting
Figure 4. Phase 2: during the voting
Note that we slightly modified the interpretation of the mes-
420
sage sequence: we used a dashed action to indicate that it is
optional.
Note also that the task of the server is not very com-
plex. In fact, because there is no session information shared
with the clients, and because storing votes is based upon
file storage in the current setup, backup and the use of mul-
tiple servers is extremely simple.
After the voting After the elections are closed, three parties
come into action. First, SURFnet hands over all collected
technical votes to TTPI. TTPI starts by computing an MD5
hash over these files in order to prove that they did not mod-
ify the votes from the server. Next, TTPI computes the total
outcome and the official voting office publishes it.
Before TTPI starts working on the technical votes given
to them by SURFnet, they transform the scanned paper bal-
lots received by mail into technical votes and add them to
the files received from SURFnet. From this point on they are
treated as internet votes as well. Hence if we talk about tech-
nical votes they can originate either from an internet vote or
from a mail vote.
TTPI computes the outcome of the election by comput-
ing for each technical vote the MDC hash on both parts. In
order for a vote to be valid, the combination of these hashes
needs to be somewhere in the reference table. Votes that do
not comply with this rule are automatically marked as in-
valid. Furthermore, if the hashes do represent a real vote,
TTPI checks whether the vote might be invalid because of
some other reason, e.g. if one voter has cast votes for dif-
ferent candidates. If a vote is declared invalid, a log entry is
created indicating why it was invalid and hence not counted.
A later check can then reveal what happened to a particu-
lar vote. After filtering out all invalid votes, the valid votes
that appear more than once are also reduced to one occur-
rence. Finally, the actual counting is done by looking up the
hashes in the reference table and assigning the correct num-
ber of votes to the indicated candidates. See Figure 5.
3. Verification of election outcome
We have stated already in the introduction that one of the
distinguishing features of RIES is that it is transparent. Each
voter can check what has happened to his personal vote and
anyone who is interested can verify the tally process. In par-
ticular this means that also people who were not allowed to
vote can check the results.
3.1. Voter specific check
A voter can check his vote because he sees his techni-
cal vote on his screen during voting. If he saves this infor-
mation he will later be able to search for his vote in the
post-election table. In this list next to his technical vote also
the MDC hashes of the two parts of this vote appear. With
SURFnet TTPI Voter i
Send collected votes
Secure votes
with
MD5-hash
Publish technical votes
Publish MD5-hash
Check
published
votes and
hash
Collect mail votes
Convert
mail votes
into
technical
votes
Compute
MDC-hash
of each vote
Publish post-election table
Check
validity with
pre-election
table
Check own
vote in post-
election
table
Derive
outcome
from valid
votes
Publish outcome
After the voting
Figure 5. Phase 3: After the voting
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those values he can check in the reference table that his vote
was indeed given to his favorite candidate. In the current im-
plementation, there is a drawback to this check system. It is
completely based upon the service provided by TTPI: they
have already computed the hashes! So if a voter wants to
be really sure TTPI did not mess with his vote, he will have
to compute the hashes himself. Fortunately there are pro-
grams or third parties available that can do this.
3.2. General outcome check
The outsider tally verification is also based upon the fact
that the computation of the MDC hash can be done by any-
one. The authors have written a Java program that uses the
files available for download at the website to compute the fi-
nal result. Though conceptually easy, we encountered some
problems while writing this program.
First of all there is a problem with the files to start with.
Theoretically we should start with the files handed over by
SURFnet. They are available for download, but the prob-
lem is that these files do not include the technical votes that
come from the votes sent by ordinary mail. Therefore we
were forced to use a file which was generated by TTPI and
hence our tally still depends on theirs. Currently there is no
way to avoid this dependency. Fortunately, we were able to
see that at least the internet votes in the file we used matches
one to one with the SURFnet files.
The second problem we encountered was in the rules de-
termining whether a vote is valid or not. On implementing
the rules presented by the RIES project team, we had to
make some choices on the order of performing the different
validity tests. Obviously, for the outcome of the tally it is not
important to know why a specific vote has been declared in-
valid. The only thing important is that the same set of votes
is declared illegal in the different tally programs. However,
the choices we made incidentally happened to declare votes
invalid for exactly the same reason as the original tally soft-
ware from TTPI. And hence the outcome of our tally was
exactly the same as TTPI’s outcome, which was used as of-
ficial outcome of the elections.
4. Threats
In this section we mention some general well known
threats to internet voting systems and explain to what ex-
tent they are indeed real threats to RIES. The threats are
listed in random order.
• A virus on the local PC modifying the vote. Such a
virus can read the personal key Ki and can compute a
valid vote for any candidate it wants, since this list of
candidates is known before the elections and the IDs
are equal for all voters. However, fraud like this can
be detected. If the virus shows the technical vote to the
voter corresponding to the voter’s choice, the voter will
see that this vote is not present in the post-election ta-
ble. The same holds if the virus shows a random tech-
nical vote to the voter. If the virus shows the techni-
cal vote of the virus’s choice, the vote will be listed in
the post-election table, but comparing it with the pre-
election table will reveal that the vote is given to a dif-
ferent candidate.
There are also other alternatives to protect against
such viruses such as using candidate-identities that are
different for each voter, so that the virus does not know
which identity to select. But this is not part of RIES.
• A virus on the local PC compromising privacy. Al-
though fraud by a virus with respect to the value of
the vote can be detected by the voter afterwards, a
virus can compromise the privacy of a voter. Parallel
to sending the correct vote to the vote server, a virus
can also send this vote to a different server and pub-
lish the vote together with some personal information
like ip-address, user name and other circumstantial ev-
idence of the voter’s identity.
• Compromise privacy from outside. Because the secret
keys used are only known inside the PC, it is not pos-
sible to link a specific vote from its hashed value back
to the original candidate from outside. Of course this
implies that the order used to list the VOTER IDs in
the pre-election reference table should not be corre-
lated with the identity of the voters. As usual key man-
agement is important. Both TTPI as well as the voter
should destroy the keys after they used them.
• Family voting. This is a serious problem with all sys-
tems where the votes are cast outside a controlled envi-
ronment. If the voter is forced to vote for someone else,
he can make this vote invalid afterwards by casting an-
other vote to a different person. However, the person
responsible for the forced vote is also able to detect
that the original vote is not counted. Hence the voter
loses his right to vote properly and runs the risk of ac-
tions against him after all.
• Buying votes. The problem here is more or less equal
to the family voting issue. If you buy a vote from some-
one, he is very well able to double cross you. But you
can detect this afterwards.
• Compromise secrecy. Because of the 128bit SSL con-
nection between the browser and the server it will not
be possible to eavesdrop on the line and decrypt the
messages between the voter’s browser and the server.
Assuming that a good implementation of the protocol
is used of course.
• Compromise identity of the vote server. The official
vote server www.internetstemmen.nl uses a certificate
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to identify itself. A fake server will not be able to
do this as well. However, if the voter has no knowl-
edge about these certificates he can be easily fooled.
If someone manages to hack a DNS server to redirect
http://www.internetstemmen.nl to his own server, the
voter will not know that something is wrong unless he
already knows that he should be redirected to the se-
cure address https://www.internetstemmen.nl. There-
fore it would be wise to put this https address in the
vote ballot and not the http address. Because of the use
of certificates it is not possible to direct the voters to
fake vote servers.
• Compromise integrity of the vote server. The server
might be compromised by script kiddies or more pro-
fessional hackers. This can never completely be pre-
vented. However, the authors did a serious test on the
server setup by SURFnet and concluded that SURFnet
had taken this risk very seriously.
• DDOS attack. This will always be an inherent prob-
lem to internet elections and hence also to RIES. It is
a matter of money: how much do you want to spend
in order to keep the system up and running. During
the elections there were no problems with DDOS at-
tacks. SURFnet had taken technical measures to han-
dle heavy traffic. Two servers were used, providing an
overcapacity of 97%.
• Key size of 56 bits. We have not looked at the strength
of the algorithm to generate the keys. Or to the strength
of keys in general of this length, although it is known
that keys of 56 bits can be broken. However, the cryp-
tographic issues of RIES have been reviewed by a team
of the Cryptomathic company in Aarhus, Denmark [7].
Their general conclusion was that RIES reflects the
state of the art in commercial e-vote systems and im-
plemented unusually much security compared to the
available budget.
• Insider attacks. The current setup is vulnerable with
respect to attacks from the inside. SURFnet is able to
delete votes for candidates they don’t like. The person-
nel handling the conversion from mail votes into tech-
nical votes might have the algorithm to extract the se-
cret keys from the codes on the paper forms and hence
derive valid votes for the candidates they want. And of
course TTPI might abuse the secret keys they gener-
ated or even the master key used to generate these se-
cret keys.
5. Critical remarks
As we have seen in the previous sections, RIES presents
a practical way to set up safe internet elections, in the sense
that voters can detect fraud. Moreover, the designers have
paid attention to usability aspects. Much time has been
spent on assessing the capabilities of the potential users, and
adapting the system to their needs. Sometimes this meant
sacrificing some high-tech security, but transparency is at
least an equally important factor in gaining trust.
Some critical remarks are appropriate, however. They
can contribute to an even better system.
• As we have seen in Section 3 internet voters can check
what happens to their own vote. We would like to stress
that it is important that voters indeed use this possi-
bility. Unfortunately, voters have complained that in
the actual use of the RIES system the procedure to
check their vote is quite complicated, hence reducing
the chance that these checks will really be carried out.
An important procedural issue here is the fact that
if there is only one voter who can prove with his cryp-
tographic confirmation receipt that he did cast his vote
correctly, but that it doesn’t show up correctly in the
post-election table, the entire election will become in-
valid.
• We have seen before that a virus on the voter’s com-
puter might change the vote sent to the server with-
out the voter knowing this. He will be able to detect
this fraud afterwards, however, he will probably not be
able to prove that he cast his vote to a different candi-
date. Since the algorithm for the cryptographic confir-
mation receipt is not made public, it is not clear what
will be in this receipt, but most likely this will include
a reference to the chosen candidate, which in case of
such a virus will be for the wrong candidate. Hence the
system would definitely be strengthened by using per
voter different identifiers for candidates.
• Since TTPI knows all ins and outs of the system it
has a lot and maybe too much power. Especially since
they are the ones who generate the secret keys and we
need to trust them in destroying these keys at the right
time. Not because we have reason to believe that they
abuse their powers, but mainly because in general a
separation of powers, compartmentalization, is wise,
we would like to see that other parties take over some
of their responsibilities.
• In Figure 2 we have seen that the ballot collection for
each voter also contains three status bits. These bits
indicate whether the corresponding vote ballot is ac-
tually being used or revoked and so on. When these
reference tables are published before the elections, the
MD5 hash over the .zip files are computed. The idea
of this hash is that it can be used to show that no id-
values of the entries inside the file have been modi-
fied during the election. However, during the elections
it might be necessary to modify the status bits. And
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hence also the hash over the file is changed. This vi-
olates the original idea: the hash cannot be used any-
more to detect easily whether the id-values have been
modified or not. It gives false positives if only the sta-
tus bits have been modified.
• Using hashes in combination with .zip files can also
lead to false positives for other reasons. If one builds
up the modified reference tables by unzipping the old
ones, applying the changes as recorded, and zipping
them again, it might still lead to differences in the
hashes. Due to different zip programs it is possible that
files are equal when unzipped will not be equal when
zipped.
• The system depends on collision free hashes. When
checking the validity (and the corresponding candi-
date) of a technical vote, MDC(VOTER ID) works as
a primary key and MDC(MAC(CANDIDATE ID)) as
a secondary key. If two valid candidates or voters are
mapped onto the same hash value, it is no longer possi-
ble to determine which candidate was the chosen one.
However, since these collisions can already be noted
by TTPI while generating the reference tables, it can
replace these problematic keys already before the key
distribution. With a good hash function such collisions
are nonetheless extremely rare.
• Besides TTPI also SURFnet needs to be trusted. Since
they are able to compute the MDC hashes on each vote
they received, they can detect for which candidate each
vote is intended implying they can delete votes as they
like. Since the MD5 hash on their received votes will
only be computed when the election has been closed
and the votes are handed over to TTPI, it is difficult
to detect such fraud. An independent party cannot de-
tect it for instance. Only if each internet voter checks
his own vote, he can detect this kind of fraud with his
vote.
• Note that it is not possible for SURFnet to add valid
votes: they need the secret keys for that. However,
since TTPI is calculating the MD5 hash to secure the
post-election table, and they had the secret keys be-
fore the election, they are in a position to alter or add
votes in favor of specific candidates. Note that they can
only do this if they offended the policy to destroy the
keys after distributing them! However, if TTPI would
add, delete or modify votes after the election is closed,
SURFnet can detect this fraud. But, if TTPI would add
votes during the election by sending them to the vote
server the way normal voters do, SURFnet cannot de-
tect this fraud. It can only be detected if they happen
to add votes for voters that really did participate in the
elections. But looking at the turnout figures, collisions
like these are not very likely to occur.
Obviously it would have looked more trustworthy if
SURFnet computed the MD5 hash before handing the
files over to TTPI, because they never had the secret
keys in their possession.
• In general it is good to have open source software for
electronic voting systems. Within RIES not all code is
open source at the moment. Fortunately, this is not a
big issue here. Since the outcome can be checked, it
is not necessary to know exactly how the software de-
rives this outcome.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a critical account of the actual
use of a little known internet voting system named RIES.
The system itself is very interesting because of its verifia-
bility: fraud can be detected. Independent recounts have in-
deed taken place—leading to the same outcome as the of-
ficial one. The procedural issues surrounding the organiza-
tion of the elections based on RIES leave room for improve-
ment. In general we can say that RIES gives us more confi-
dence towards the future of internet voting than the authors
of [4] provide.
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